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Unblocking the Sacred: New perspectives on the 
religious revival in South Eastern Europe 
Emil Hilton Saggau, University of Copenhagen, Faculty of Theology
ABSTRACT: Many studies of contemporary religion in South Eastern Europe 
link resurgent nationalism to the revival of religion, arguing that nationalism 
is grounded in religion and has taken over many former religious symbols, 
beliefs and rituals. This argument is a key feature of social science studies 
of religion in the region. In cases from the former Yugoslavia, focus on this 
type of connection between religion and nationalism has prevented a more 
nuanced description of the religious transformation of communities after the 
fall of communism. This article will discuss the pitfalls of such a simplification 
and how it is possible to nuance the study of religion in the South Eastern 
European context. This will be done through a critical review of studies of 
religion in Montenegro and an examination of the local badnjak Christmas 
ritual. This article aims to craft a revised analytical strategy the nuances the 
connection between religion and nationalism but also acknowledges religion 
as its own system.
KEYWORDS: Religion, Nationalism, South Eastern Europe, Montenegro, 
Serbia, Eastern Orthodoxy
The revival of Eastern Orthodoxy and nationalism 
On June 28, 1989, the Serbian saint’s day, Vidovodan, was celebrated at Kosovo Polje in 
Kosovo. The day marked the 500th anniversary of the battle at Kosovo Polje and the fall and 
death of St. Prince Lazar. During the celebration, then Serbian president, Slobodan Milošević, 
took the stage. Milošević gave what would come to be known as the Gazimestan speech, which 
marked the return of religion and nationalism—two sets of beliefs and practices that had been 
marginalized for decades by the communist authorities throughout South Eastern Europe. 
This marked the decline of the communist ideology and the beginning of a new era for nation-
states and churches throughout South Eastern Europe. Milošević spoke of the Serbian nation, 
the Serbian state and the Serbian Orthodox Church as one unit in which ethnicity, identity and 
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religion could not be separated and a historical unit upon which the Serbian state stood and 
depended.1 
However, Milošević’s speech at Kosovo Polje was not a turning point ushering in a new 
time of revival and reconnection between the nationalism of nations in existence before the 
communist take-over and the churches of these nation-states. The speech was rather a witness 
to how nationalism and religion had slowly become a new foundation upon which states, 
political elites, and ethnic groups would build their identity after communism. This process 
took place throughout the formerly communist-controlled Eastern European region from 
Moldova (Zabarah 2011) in the northeast to Croatia (Pavlakovic et al. 2001) in the southwest. 
The region saw a revival of religious communities and national movements, which took 
place in different forms and at different speeds, before and during the political transition of 
these formerly totalitarian-controlled nation-states. These movements were quite noticeable 
in the former socialist federation of Yugoslavia, where the ruling authorities had relied on the 
creation of a common Yugoslav identity and an acceptance of local republics’ ethnic identities 
to ensure a peaceful co-existence (Lampe 2000). The rise of nationalism and religion—as well 
as several other factors— challenged this federation and led to its dissolution amid wars, civil 
wars and the formation of new nation-states. Religious communities and national movements 
often formed opposition groups against the communist authorities, which added to the new 
prominence of religion and nationalism in the region (Clardie 2016, 18). Indeed, religion and 
nationalism were the counterpoints to communism in many states. The prominence of religion 
in the region was even further advanced by a series of political, social and economic initiatives, 
such as the Serbian revision of the laws on religion granting the Orthodox community access 
to funds, sites and a role in the new school system (Pollack and Rosta, 2017, 416).
In the early 1990s, the rise of nationalism and religion created stronger differentiation 
between the former Yugoslav republics, and these two forces came to be seen as the primary 
drivers behind the Yugoslav wars, as well as the main factors that caused an onslaught on 
civilians of different ethnicities and religious groups, according to several studies, such as 
those by Branimir Anzulovic (1999) and Michael Sells (1998). 
This interpretation of the conflict in Yugoslavia has meant that the studies of religion, 
especially in Serbia, Montenegro and Macedonia, such as those by František Šistek (2010) and 
Milan Vukomanovic (2008), have focused, above all, on the connection between religion and 
nationalism. In these studies, it is argued that nationalistic movements use religion and the 
religious world-system to attain political goals. This is often referred to as “clericalization” of 
politics (Blagojević 2008, 39). This assumption and analytical point of view has become an all-
encompassing departure into studies of religion, blocking a more nuanced picture of religion 
in the area and of the revival of its religious communities. 
This article seeks to reexamine this assumption and point of view to religion—theoretically 
and through an in-depth study of a case from Montenegro—in order to underline the need to 
historically and sociologically understand religion in the former Yugoslav republics before 
any conclusion can be reached and to discuss how a more nuanced approach to religion in 
these states could be shaped. The entanglement of religion and the politics of nationalism 
often leads to an “easy avenue” of analysis, whereby religion is simplified and reduced to 
categories of nationalism without the proper contextualization of its religious practices, ideas 
and symbols. 
This article consists of three parts. The first one is a short review of recent studies on 
religion and nationalism in Yugoslavia and Montenegro to highlight how religion has been 
1 The full speech in Serbian is accessible here: http://www.pecat.co.rs/2011/06/govor-slobodana-milosevica-na-
gazimestanu-1989-godine/ /retrieved 07.01.2017.
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studied and theoretically framed, and how its connection to nationalism has been identified. 
The second part of the paper is a case study from Montenegro, exemplifying the blind spots 
and oversimplification that studies have made in relation to religion in this particular case. The 
final part is a discussion of how a more nuanced approach, called nationalization of the sacred, 
could be shaped and how such an approach would function.
Studies of religion and nationalism in Yugoslavia
In his key study of religion and nationalism in the former Yugoslav republics, Vjekoslav 
Perica (2002, 6) claims that the formation of the ethnic “nations” (Croats, Serbs, Slovenes etc.) 
of Yugoslavia were based on an identification of links between religion and nationalism. This 
connection was forged in the 20th and 21st centuries by various religious institutions, scholars 
and state elites during the formation of the first Yugoslavia and its predecessor states. Perica 
argues that this connection was necessary in order for the political elites to legitimize their 
power in myths and achieve the subsequent sacralization of the nation-state. This new, sacred 
foundation of the nation secured the political elites’ hold on power, and the population’s 
support of the state—in Perica’s terms, the church, nation and state became inseparable. 
This interpretation of religion is primarily based on the functionalist approach to social 
phenomena, such as religion and nationalism, as Perica notes (2002, 6). The functionalist 
approach focuses on the function of religion and the nation within a specific political and 
cultural context and on how individuals or groups use these concepts to make sense of the 
world, accumulate power and legitimize the use of power. The functionalist approach is 
based on the notion that religion and nationalism gain prominence in a society to solve or 
answer a problem. An example is the belief in the afterlife, which in functionalism is seen 
as the answer to the problem of mortality. Therefore, religion is not defined by what it is (its 
content), but rather what it does or achieves (its function). In this way, functionalism leads to 
a reactive definition and interpretation of religion—religion needs to do something or achieve 
something before it can be studied. Functionalism, therefore, only paints a partial picture, as 
Detlef Pollack and Gergely Rosta note (2017, 40); however, the functionalist interpretation is 
nevertheless a suitable analytical tool to examine the former Eastern Bloc over the last thirty 
years. Functionalism is well suited to study religion empirically, because it highlights the 
social features of religion regardless of the religions inner logic. 
 The fall of communism meant that the problems of identity, belonging and fulfilling 
everyday practical needs had to be re-defined and re-adjusted to a new world order where 
communism no longer had an iron grip on society. In such circumstances, the functionalistic 
analysis is able to grasp and nuances the relations between identity and religion. Religious 
communities rose to the forefront of the affected societies, and their offer of redemption or 
belonging was necessary once more. Therefore, religion and nationalism overtook the functions 
of communism, in the same manner as communism had overtaken many former religious 
functions almost half a century before (Pollack and Rosta, 2017, 39-40).
According to the functionalist approach, religion is a system of beliefs and practices that 
corresponds to a system of national beliefs and practices. Both of these systems of symbols, 
ideas and practices could support a group identity, such as the imagination of a collective 
community of a nation (Anderson 1998). The theoretical backbone of functionalistic studies 
of religion is the constructivist school of nationalism (Tomka et al. 2016, 81). Functionalism’s 
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approach to nationalism is a constructivist one; a range of examples can be found in Pål Kolstø 
et al.’s (2014) anthology, which focuses on strategies for nation-building in the Balkans. 
In constructivism, nationalism and religion are characterized by their social roles and 
interpreted as constructions of human imagination; in that sense, religion and nationalism are 
similar, and, therefore, religious practices and beliefs can correspond to national ones. Key 
differences, however, are their contextual and historical aspects. Religions, as organized and 
practicing communities, often transcend national boundaries and draw from older and deeper 
traditions. Religion, therefore, often has the aura of authenticity, which newer constructions 
lack. Nationalism, as Benedict Anderson (1998) points out, has grown out of religion and has 
“borrowed” its authenticity (Tomka et al. 2016, 83-85). In other words, nationalism sometimes 
uses religious practices and beliefs to claim legitimacy and authenticity as a true nation, as 
Andrew Hastings (1997, 187-188) shows in greater detail. 
The notion that religion is more authentic builds on an assumption that religion and 
nationalism are not identical forms of a cultural system. Nationalism is a different kind of 
phenomenon, or a “differentia specifica,” to quote Pollack and Rosta (2017, 36). Using this 
perspective, religion is irreducible because it has features that separate it from other human 
systems, such as the political principles of nationalism. A classic description of a unique 
religious feature is Rudolf Otto’s (1920) description of “the holy” in his seminal work from 
1917. According to Otto, “the holy” should be understood as a numinous and mysterious force 
that creates both fascination and terror in its spectators (mysterium tremendum et fascinosum). 
This force, which makes places holy or sacred, is a unique feature of religion. Meanwhile, 
nationalism, could be defined as a political principle based on a national identification or 
cultural similarity, as Ernest Gellner (1997) states in his classic definition.
Perica (2002, 6) works with a functionalist approach and is aware of the potential danger 
of his definitions of religion and nationalism, which leads to critical reflection on this issue 
within his work. However, Perica’s description of the connection between nationalism and 
religion in Yugoslavia is echoed and retold—in a less reflective manner—through a vast body 
of literature on religion in the Yugoslav-sphere (e.g., Merdjanova 2000; Sells 1998; Kolstå 2014; 
Vukomanovic 2008; Anzulovic 1999; Mylonas 2006). The same connection between religion 
and nationalism outside Yugoslavia can be found in Daniel Payne’s study (2007), where the 
approach is broadened to cover Eastern Europe in general. The aforementioned studies often 
reproduce or accept Perica’s notion. As Daniela Kalkandjieva concludes in a 2011 study, 
such an uncritical assumption about the connection between church, state and nation/ethnic 
community need to be supported rather than assumed. Symbols, rituals, beliefs and ideas 
often have histories of their own that do not necessarily correspond one-to-one to a national 
narrative, as Kalkandjieva (2011, 2016) shows in her examination of the Orthodox idea of state-
church relations. A function within one system of practice and belief is not necessarily directly 
transferable to another. 
The point of departure for this article is that Perica and others’ approaches to religion in 
Yugoslavia have prevented a deeper understanding of the concrete dynamics at play because, 
as Kalkandjieva (2011) warns, these studies have oversimplified the connection between 
religion and nationalism. The aforementioned scholars have come to see religion as a part of 
culture in broad terms and have, therefore, reduced the concept to an empty category. My main 
critique levied against these studies is that this reduction lose sights of religious function in a 
broader historical and cultural context. Studies of religion in Yugoslavia (Vukomanovic 2008; 
Anzulovic 1999; Mylonas 2006) have taken the functionalist approach too far in their study of 
nationalism and have skipped over the contextualization of social phenomena. This hypothesis 
is unfolded and tested in the present article by an examination of the case of Montenegro to 
determine whether it could be ascribed to the inherent problem in functionalism.
© RASCEE, www.rascee.net
2018, 11 (1)
Saggau, E. H.: Unblocking the Sacred 43
Montenegro: Religion as the hallmark of nationalism?
Since the fall of communism, religion in Montenegro has mainly been studied within the 
social sciences, as is the case for many other former Yugoslav countries. Most seminal and 
contemporary studies of Montenegrin society are focused on the transition of Montenegro 
from a Yugoslav republic to an independent state in 2006, such as those by Kenneth Morrison 
(2009) and Florian Bieber et al. (2003). Those studies touch on religion as a political matter. 
In other social science studies (Džankić 2014a; Pavicevic et al. 2009), religion is analyzed, but 
only in relation to the newly-formed independent Montenegrin ethnic identity or the political 
divide between the pro-Serb-unionist and the pro-Montenegrin-independence movements. A 
few studies in Serbian and English deal with the socio-religious context in Montenegro (e.g., 
Bakrač 2011, 2012; Bakrač et al. 2013) or focus on the local Muslim community (e.g., Kajoshaj 
2010; Pačariz 2015), but they are descriptive and deal mostly with the social and legal setting 
of religion in Montenegrin society. 
Only a handful of internationally published studies directly address the majority religion, 
Eastern Orthodoxy (Kube 2012; Džankić 2013, 2014b; 2016; Šistek 2010; Morrison 2015; 
Zdravkovski et al. 2014). A common denominator for studies of Eastern Orthodoxy in 
Montenegro is that they seem to be extensions of Perica’s (2002) landmark study and approach 
to religion. This means that they explain and examine religion through the context of the 
functionalist and constructivist theories and conceptions of nationalism. A noticeable study 
that departs from this trail is Alice Forbess’s work (2013), which is an anthropological study of 
the Eastern Orthodox communities in Montenegro. However, Forbess’s main focus is not on 
religion per se, but rather on the connection between religious charisma, the image of heroic 
clans and the state-building process, as seen from an anthropological angle; religion becomes 
a charismatic power rather than an explanation for nationalism due to Forbess’s focus on the 
practices of communities and individuals. 
A series of studies (Kube 2012; Džankić 2013, 2014b, 2016; Šistek 2010; Morrison 2015; 
Zdravkovski et al. 2014) seem to base their analyses of religion on the functionalist approach 
due to the personal relationships between religious community leaders and political parties, 
non-govermental organizations (NGOs) and/or state institutions. This entanglement enabled 
close personal and institutional connections between the Montenegrin political elite and the 
local, unrecognized Montenegrin Orthodox Church, as well as between the local Serbian 
Orthodox Metropolitanate, its charismatic leader, Metropolitan Amfilohije (Radović) and 
the pro-Serbian elite in Montenegrin politics (Morrison 2009). Since these social and political 
relationships were so visible (see Saggau 2017a), it is an obvious choice for scholars to focus 
on the relationship between religion and nationalism. A key example is Stefan Kube’s (2012) 
study in which he discusses the sacralization of the state in Montenegro. Kube quickly reaches 
the conclusion that the competition between the two Orthodox communities in Montenegro 
(the Serbian and Montenegrin one) can be linked back to competition between a Serbian-
oriented nationhood and a Montenegrin one. The issue of religious conflict and the process 
of sacralization is distilled down to an issue of nationhood and a political question about 
whether Montenegro should be independent of Serbia. The personal and institutional alliances 
in Montenegro determined the content of Kube’s analysis and overshadowed the concrete 
religio-social dynamics at play.
The connection highlighted by Kube is correct, but his analysis fails to grasp the whole 
story. In particular, his description uncritically caters to the nationalist-oriented political elites 
in Montenegro who seek to portray churches as agents of the nation rather than as religious 
communities (Saggau 2017a, 13-15). The conclusions made by Kube and others (Džankić 2013, 
2014b, 2016; Šistek 2010; Morrison 2015; Zdravkovski et al. 2014) support the image of religion 
and Eastern Orthodoxy in Montenegro as a symbolic continuation of nationalist and political 
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in-fighting. Accordingly, religious institutions are deprived of their religious features to 
become political organizations, religion as a category of meaning is emptied and its beliefs and 
practices are turned into a national or externally religious system. Such a conclusion seems to 
take the constructivist and functionalist approach too far and does not consider the cultural 
and historical contexts. Instead, religion is seen as a phenomenon that can only function within 
a national political system. 
A case from Montenegro
This section discusses a specific case from Montenegro to reveal how the blurring of the 
border between religion and nationalism could block a deeper understanding of religion. 
The case examines the practices and beliefs connected to a specific ritual, known as the 
badnjak [bǎdɲaːk], which is known throughout South Eastern Europe and the Slavic parts of 
Christendom. This widespread Christmas practice consists of a burning of a log to commemorate 
the birth of Christ, accompanied by either a local family ritual or a ritual performed by a priest. 
Badjnak was discouraged in Montenegro and throughout Yugoslavia during the communist 
period, but, since the early 1990s, it has become a central part of the Christmas celebration, 
especially among Eastern Orthodox believers in Serbia and Montenegro. 
Originally in the nineteenth century, the ritual was a family one, in which a log was selected 
on Christmas day and burned in the evening. In the 20th century, the ritual became a public 
one that was often celebrated in large Orthodox cities across the Balkans. In Montenegro, a log 
is burned in front of the Monastery of Cetinje, which is the center of Orthodoxy in Montenegro, 
and most families from the city attend. This practice might date back to the Montenegrin 
Kingdom before World War I. Traditionally, the burning of the log is overseen by the local 
Eastern Orthodox Metropolitan. The ritual can best be described as a large bonfire at which 
traditional Montenegrin epic songs are sung, accompanied by the guslar, a Balkan guitar. It is 
not a strict ritual and has kept some of the characteristics from the original family ritual. The 
attendees often engage in small-talk or conduct business and kids play while their parents 
go back and forth on the streets during the burning of the log. It is very informal, which is 
typical for outdoor Orthodox gatherings in the Balkans. At the ritual, the priest often gives a 
short speech or sermon ending with the distribution of hot locally-brewed brandy, wine or tea, 
along with food, as an informal symbol of the Eucharist. 
In the early 1990s, during the rise of Serbian nationalism across the Balkans, the Serbian 
Metropolitan, Amfilohije, took the seat reserved for the Metropolitan of the Serbian Orthodox 
Church in Montenegro. Serbian flags and traditional Serbian songs were, therefore, at the 
forefront of the event. In opposition to Amfilohije, a group of citizens in Cetinje began having 
their own log burning ritual, just a few hundred meters away, in front of King Nikola’s palace, 
which was the home of the last Montenegrin king. At this badnjak, Montenegrin flags were 
displayed and traditional songs of the Montenegrin clans were sung. As such, the badnjak 
ritual became a public display of Montenegrin citizens’ support or opposition to Metropolitan 
Amfilohije. Since the formation of the canonically unrecognized Montenegrin Orthodox 
Church in 1993, the badnjak at Nikola’s palace has been overseen by the leader of that church 
(Morrison 2015). Today, the ritual is more of a public manifestation of the strength of the two 
parties, rather than a religious rite and could be better described as a political demonstration—
with flags, songs and speeches from religious leaders—taking place around a bonfire. The 
presence of armed police and occasional confrontations between the supporters of the two 
churches have also changed the atmosphere of the event. However, regardless of the political 
© RASCEE, www.rascee.net
2018, 11 (1)
Saggau, E. H.: Unblocking the Sacred 45
content, the center of the event is still the burning of the log as a symbol of a tree from Paradise, 
which sparks hope about the birth of Christ.
Kube (2012), Morrison (2015) and Šistek (2010) explain this yearly event and display of 
Montenegrin and Serbian symbols as a point of departure in the discussion of religion in 
Montenegro. Kube simply notes (2012, 116, 130-131) that the background for the competing 
badnjak celebrations is the rebuilding of Montenegrin and Serbian nationhoods. The same 
point is reached by Šistek (2010, 1), who calls it “a clericalization of nationalism” (as his 
articles title) underlining that the clerics are merely seen as agents for two opposing nationalist 
movements. Morrison (2015, 110-111) notes that the ritual is used by each party to display their 
belonging to a Serbian and Montenegrin nation, and that the Serbian Orthodox Church claims 
the event as a “Serbian tradition.” Kube (2012), Morrison (2015) and Šistek (2010) have valid 
points, but they never dwell on whether the display of national belonging is all there is to say 
about the event. There are also several open questions: Why is this tradition, place and form 
used by the nationalist movements? Are the displays only about bolstering the nationalism of 
the Montenegrins and the Serbians? What is the content of this ritual (practice) and the belief 
system attached to it? Why is it so important that the two opposing groups recapture the ritual 
as theirs? 
Part of the answers to the question on the central importance of this ritual can be found 
much deeper in Montenegro’s religious and cultural heritage. Badjnak and Christmas have 
religious and cultural meanings that reach beyond any other rituals, events or practices in 
Montenegro. The reason for this dates back to Petar II Petrović-Njegoš (1813-1851), who ruled 
the land as both its secular and religious leader, as his family had done since the 16th century. 
Njegoš was also a well-known poet, and his most famous work is the epic, “Gorski vijenac” 
(The Mountain Wreath, 1847). The work is about his forefather, Danilo I, and the clansmen 
of Montenegro and tells the tale of how, during Christmas, they “cleansed” Montenegro 
of all Muslim Montenegrins who did not renounce Islam (the event is often referred to as 
the Montenegrin Vesper). The tale is told as an allegedly historical event, and it has been 
interpreted as the event that secured Montenegro as an Orthodox land and paved the way for 
the region’s independence from the Muslim Ottoman Empire (Roberts 2007, 132-136). The epic 
has a few lines about badnjak, where the ritual is mentioned as the least a Slavic family could 
do in order to honor the Christian and Slavic traditions. Njegoš (2007) writes:
Let flare the Serbian Christmas log [badnjak]
Pain gaily too the eggs for Eastertide;
Observe with care the Lent and Autumn Fasts,
And for the rest—do what is dear to thee! (859-863)
In the epic, badnjak was the benchmark for being an Orthodox Slav. It became a central 
cultural cue, since “The Mountain Wreath” was added to the standard curriculum throughout 
both the royal and socialist Yugoslavian state; the epic was considered a source of inspiration 
for ethnic chauvinism and ethnic cleansing, as well as for thoughts about freedom and liberty 
(Pavlovic 2001; Wachtel 2004).
Christmas in Cetinje, Montenegro, also holds more recent historical memories. During 
the 1918 holiday, a group of Montenegrins revolted against the Belgrade army, which had 
taken control of the land after the collapse of the Austrian Empire and wouldn’t allow the last 
Petrović king to return to his capital. The uprising in 1918 is known as the Montenegrin civil 
war, which ended when the Montenegrin rebels were heavily defeated by the Belgrade army. 
The same year marked the end of Montenegro as an independent country, which meant that 
the Montenegrin Orthodox Church was dismantled soon after and turned into a part of the 
Belgrade Patriarchate (Roberts 2007, 324). The Christmas uprising of 1918 and the Montenegrin 
civil war have significant political symbolism today and are currently used as reference points 
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in parliamentary discussions between pro-Serbian and pro-Montenegrin officials (Tanner 
2017). The Montenegrin civil war is also closely related to current strife between the Serbian 
Orthodox Metropolitanate and the canonically unrecognized Montenegrin Orthodox Church, 
because the latter’s status and the debate on its ownership rights to property now belonging to 
the Serbian Orthodox Church have their roots in the aftermath of the war.
As briefly described above, the cultural and religious meaning of badnjak in Montenegro 
and in Cetinje, in particular, draws on deep traditions, which explains the unanswered 
questions in Kube’s (2012), Morrison’s (2015) and Šistek’s (2010) studies. The fullness of the 
meaning of the ritual is found in the religious and cultural history of Montenegro, which 
has shaped the scene onto which the nationalist struggles of today are played. This religious 
history and how it has been retold are central to understanding how nationalism uses the 
religious system of practices. As Tomkas et al. (2014, 83) note, in reference to Turner (2006), 
the religious system has a certain depth that political systems—such as nationalism—lack. The 
religious phenomenon of ritual needs to be understood as a function within certain historical 
and cultural contexts before its function within the political system can make sense. Christmas 
in Montenegro is not only a religious event celebrating the birth of Christ, but it is closely 
intertwined with Eastern Orthodox history and related to the religious and political fate of the 
region. Christmas in Montenegro marks the birth of Christ, as well as the Montenegrin Vesper, 
the Montenegrin civil war and the central status of Njegoš. Therefore, it is perhaps the most 
important holiday for commemorating the Montenegrin past. 
Traditionalism, revivalism or a new religion?
The badnjak ritual also points to a socio-religious structure that serves as the basis for other 
perspectives on religion in Montenegro. Perica (2002) notes that religion in Yugoslavia was 
more of a public display of belonging than a personal belief kept private. In this view, religion 
is a public affair that could be defined in functionalist terms as the practices of “belong, behave 
and belief” (Akongul 2016, 145). Displays of belonging and behaving at public events are 
religious practices as much as a national ones—and ones that occur regardless of the personal 
beliefs of the individual participants.
Badjnak displays a certain set of religious belonging and behaving practices that are 
noticeably separate from national ones. Badjnak, in Cetinje, despite its centuries-old history, is 
a revived and transformed ritual. The traditional ritual was performed in one place, but it has 
been transformed into two rituals in the same city by the opposing Montenegrin and Serbian 
movements, who refuse to perform a united ritual. Thus, the tradition has been disturbed and 
turned into something new. The newly invented features of the ritual point to the “novelty” 
of the two Churches involved in these events. Both organizations have experienced significant 
transformations during the past thirty years: the Serbian Orthodox Church changed from being 
a marginalized community to a central and influential societal actor, while the Montenegrin 
Orthodox Church was revived. Therefore, it makes sense to religio-sociologically examine 
whether these organizations can be considered “new” revivalist religions. Such organizations 
are often characterized as adolescent and act in similar patterns because they are both new 
and religious (Barker 2013). Such communities are often small in number, focused on person-
to-person interactions and led by a charismatic leader. Organizations of this type are often 
highly unpredictable and their core members are often very enthusiastic (Barker 2013, 14). 
The uncanonical Montenegrin Orthodox Church fits well into this category socially due to its 
small size—approximately 5,000 core believers and a handful of churches—and its relatively 
recent establishment, but its content should be labeled as “revivalist” (Saggau 2017a, 49-50). 
The Serbian Metropolitanate in Montenegro, a semi-autonomous organizational part of the 
Serbian Orthodox Church, has traits that correspond with new religions, such as enthusiastic 
© RASCEE, www.rascee.net
2018, 11 (1)
Saggau, E. H.: Unblocking the Sacred 47
core members and a central charismatic leader, but it has many more members than a typical 
new religion, estimated to around 40 pct. of the population of Montenegro, and a strong and 
long established infrastructure of churches, clerics, etc. (Saggau 2017a, 35-36, 38-40). To some 
extent, the novelty of the Badjnak ritual reflects the revivalism present in both the Serbian and 
Montenegrin Orthodox Churches.
Specifically regarding badnjak, both Churches display the same socio-religious structures. 
First, each Church has incorporated national songs, flags and symbols into its version of the 
ritual to highlight the differences between the two rituals and the two communities. The 
national flags and songs play religious roles—apart from their national ones—because they 
mark the differences between the two seemingly identical rituals. Second, both the Serbian 
and Montenegrin flags use traditional crosses in their national flags. The Serbian cross and the 
Montenegrin cross each signify a different, deeply religious tradition. The Serbian cross is a state 
symbol for Serbia and was used by its royal house. Traditionally, the cross is golden-yellow, 
with four Cyrillic “c” letters between its arms. Meanwhile, the Montenegrin cross was the 
symbol used by the medieval dukes of old Montenegro and the Montenegrin Metropolitanate 
under the Ottoman Empire. It looks similar to the traditional Maltese cross and is traditionally 
white on a red background. Each cross also refers to a national symbol of either the Serbian or 
Montenegrin saints.
In addition, both versions of the badnjak ritual reinforce each other because neither Church 
can step down and let the other one take possession of the tradition. The two rituals preserve 
the need for charismatic leaders and enthusiastic core members who will turn up every 
Christmas. Badjnak, thereby, has become symptomatic of religiosity in the Balkans and reveals 
how religion has been put to the forefront of the cultural renegotiation of identity in the region. 
At the same time, the two rituals are basically the same and their function is to secure a path 
between Montenegro’s former system of religious beliefs and those of its new communities. In 
that view, badnjak is a religious gateway to history and its function is to answer the very core 
question of identity and belonging. The ritual in itself holds the numinous power to fascinate 
and terrify (Otto 1920), which both communities seek to control. The burning of the log is still 
the center of the ritual and not the national flags.
The badnjak ritual also reveals a historical pathway and highlights the various cultural and 
religious traditions in use—which are lost when the ritual is only interpreted as a nationalist 
display. This pathway and the ritual’s numinous power are of great importance to both 
Churches, but more so for the unrecognized Montenegrin Orthodox Church. In the Montenegrin 
Orthodox Church’s own magazine, badnjak is used as a central point of reference to connect 
the Church’s recent history with Montenegro’s history and the history of Christendom. In a 
recent article  (Lucindan 2015), the Montenegrin Orthodox Church reports on its badnjak in 
the Montenegrin city of Kotor. In the article, a speech given at the event by the leader of the 
church is cited; the leader binds the ritual together with the spirit of Christmas and the birth of 
Christ. In the speech, Christ is remembered by how he was judged, humiliated and crucified, 
which, the religious leader comments, is “a similar fate our homeland has experienced, 
Montenegro!” (Lucindan 2015, 18, Author’s translation). The suffering of Christ is used here as 
an analogy for the suffering of Montenegro and the Montenegrin Church’s community. In this 
example, the badnjak ritual is used as a sacred bridge through which the experiences of the 
community, the historical fate of the state of Montenegro and Christ are bound together. The 
ritual reinforces the belief that the community’s suffering corresponds with Christ’s suffering. 
The ritual and the preaching during the ritual not only represent an entanglement of religion 
and nationalism, but also a binding of the sacred image of Christ, the sacred ritual of his birth 
and his body (the church) to a specific nation. Thus, the religious system of meaning—here, 
the sacred numinous power—takes on a national meaning.
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Re-approaching religion in Montenegro
Behind the recent revival of religion in the Balkans, a multitude of nationalization projects 
are visible, as Pål Kolstø et al.’s (2014) anthology shows. These projects are necessary because 
the formation of the southern Slavic nations, such as the Illyrian or Yugoslav ones, have failed. 
The nationalization projects of today provide an opportunity for empirical study and concrete 
identification of the sacred within nationalism, as well as underlining the differences between 
the two. 
A contemporary example of how the sacred has been nationalized can be found within 
the unrecognized Montenegrin Orthodox Church, which is often very direct in its claims 
on parochial churches in the heartland of Montenegro. Its claims are often based upon the 
argument that the temples were built on land owned by a specific Montenegrin clan. The 
Montenegrins (a broad category), therefore, own the sacred sites, rituals and materials on their 
land, and the church buildings should either be restored to their Church or at least made the 
property of the new Montenegrin state (Lucindan 2012a, 32, 2012b, 74-75). In one article, the 
Church writes, “substantial, original and factual church property in Montenegro is clearly 
Montenegrin, and not Serbian property” (Lucindan 2013, 46, Author’s translation).
This sort of national claim on the sacred—here, churches—could be labeled, as an ecclesiology 
of kinship, because the organizational and governing structure (the ecclesiology) of the church 
is based on kinship. This structure seems to reach beyond the modern organization of states 
and even nationalism. According to this logic, the sacred and physical natures of sites are 
bound to a specific kinship within a clan; therefore, the sacred has been nationalized through 
its physical form.
This ecclesiology builds on an argument that claims that it is part of a much more genuine 
tradition of allegiance in Montenegrin society, than national allegiance. It is said that allegiance 
to kin and clans—rather that ethnicity and states—is a more “natural” form of loyalty in 
Montenegrin society (Forbess 2013). The point is not that Montenegro is still a tribal society, 
but that the sacred plays a vital role in the original clan structure of Montenegro. In this context, 
allegiance to a church is interpreted as equal to allegiance to family—loyalty through blood 
to clan and church. Belonging to a clan also means belonging to a specific church. In today’s 
world of politics, this sentiment is transferred from clan and family onto the nation, which, in 
turn, is based on the archaic structure of governance. Therefore, the nation-state is interpreted 
as a prolonging of the clan-based Montenegrin state, marking an evolution from allegiance to 
the sacred (a church) to kin or the clan to modern day nation-states.
What is at play here and in other post-Yugoslav states is not just a new form of an imagined 
community; sacred sites, rituals and materials are integrated and nationalized into parts of 
the older societal structure in new ways (e.g., Ivekovic 2002). One central argument, which is 
often used in Montenegro (see Sekulović 2010) and elsewhere in the broader Eastern Orthodox 
world, as noted by Payne (2007), is that the nationalized church and its system of beliefs is an 
embodiment of the local church, which is a theological concept used as the cornerstone of the 
Orthodox ecclesial structure. Today, the idea of the local church has been adopted by ecclesial 
and political elites as a type of theological whitewashing of nationalization. Originally, the 
concept was that the local church was a physical building, a community and an organization, 
which became integrated into Orthodox Christendom through rituals. The concept of the local 
church was initially bound to family, because the very idea of “ecclesia” (a congregation) 
was, in its biblical form, bound to a specific household and its family. This idea also exists 
in Western Christendom, as Cavanaugh notes (2011, 7). The theological concept of the local 
church has been transformed into a political or national concept, whereby the local church is 
stripped of its ecumenical and transnational implication, and the meaning of the term “local” 
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is interpreted as “national.” Today, the sacred church is integrated into local politics through 
kin and clans in such lines of argument as the ones used by the Montenegrin Orthodox Church. 
Nationalization of the sacred
Studies of religion in Montenegro and, in particular, those related to badnjak all lead 
back to the question of how religious social phenomena and praxis can be analyzed without 
reducing them to merely political or nationalist endeavors. Mainstream studies about religion 
in Montenegro are not nuanced and thus block the exploration of additional theoretical 
perspectives, which could expand or nuance the understanding of religiosity, as exemplified 
in the article’s case-study. Nuances, such as the theological, transnational, social or historical 
elements that might contradict the reduction of the Serbian and Montenegrin Orthodox 
Churches into vehicles of national politics, are not presented or reflected in the literature. In 
fact, the main problem with the traditional theoretical approach to religion in the literature 
is, as Michel de Certeau argues, the belief that a “single model (here, a political one) can in fact 
explain a society in its totality” (Certeau 1988, 120). Such an approach, according to Certeau 
(1988, 120), builds on an anthropological postulate, whereby a modern society contains both 
civilized and savage elements, and the civilized elements are given a dominant position and 
used to categorize or interpret all other elements. In this example, the politics of a state are 
given a dominant position, as the “essential” element of modern states, and “savage” religion 
is then categorized according to this (Certeau 1988, 120-122). Given this framework, politics is 
an essential feature of civility and modernity, and religion is seen as the opposite. Religion is 
categorized beneath politics, along with economics, culture and urban development. Certeau 
argues that such an approach is not nuanced, because a society advances through “a plurality 
of heterogeneous but combined developments” (1988, 121). 
One way to build upon Certeau’s critique of the simplification of religion in functionalist 
theory, could be to re-approach the events, concepts or sites studied without a single analytical 
agenda, but rather with a dialectical approach. Such an approach must preserve religion as a 
system of practices and beliefs, but, at the same time, be sensible to how that system spills over 
to the political system of nationalism. Certeau argues that each system needs to be understood 
in its own terms—distinct from each other—and then the connection between practices and 
ideologies (the passage between the two systems) can be examined. The first step in an approach 
would be formed in relation to the social or personal problems that religion or nationalism tries 
to solve individually—and how the religious or nationalist practice reflects this. The second 
step would be to look at how the two systems function together when integrated into a single 
system. Basically, the argument is that a religious system seeks to solve problems internally, 
but the religious system could be adopted by (or integrated into) a nationalist system to solve 
problems in that sphere—such as lack of authenticity, political legitimacy and credibility.
This type of approach could be used to examine Klaus Buchenau’s (2012) well-balanced 
studies of religion in South Eastern Europe. Buchenau (2012, 61) notes that the former Yugoslav 
states all experienced an increased “Sakraliserung der Nation” (sacralization of nations) during 
the early 1990s. Buchenau’s concept of sacralization is based on the notion that a nationhood, 
needs religion to bolster and strengthen its claims of authenticity and historical legitimacy. 
This concept of sacralization is also used by Milan Vukmanović (2008) in his depiction of the 
Serbian Orthodox Church’s political role in contemporary Serbian society.
The process of sacralization is a social one, whereby the nation uses religion to create an 
aura of authenticity. It draws from the sacred wells of religion and re-uses symbols, sites, 
texts or other materials. National movements and political elites use religion in this way to 
bolster their power through the use of religion; thus, religion is adopted to solve a national 
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problem. In his study, Buchenau article (2012) describes how this process took place in Serbia 
in the crucial period in the 1990s as part of the mobilization for war. The British historian, 
Adrian Hastings (2007, 187-188), provides a more concrete identification of the inner dynamic 
of the process by which religion is used to shape national formations. Hastings (2007, 187-188) 
identifies the core religious factors that could be activated to sacralize a nation. He argues that 
these factors are the various use of early traditions, events and heritage that go beyond the 
immediate present. Hastings thus identifies how nationalistic political movements can use 
religion. This labeling of nationalism use religion in Buchenau’s works, as “sacralization”, 
builds on concepts borrowed from the analysis of the differences between political religion 
and politicized religion, such as the study by Emilio Gentile (2006).
In both Buchenaue’s and Hastings’s theories, the analytical focus is on the integration 
of religious functions into nationalism; therefore, their studies still preserve the main 
functionalist method of the mainstream studies of religion in Montenegro. This mainstream 
functionalistic approach is still that religious phenomena are interpreted as part of a specific 
form of nationalism or nationhood. The categorization of religion in the mainstream studies 
still takes its analytical point of departure from nationalism. 
A more nuanced picture is created when a reverse analytical strategy supplements Buchenau 
and Hastings’s assertions. This reverse perspective could be labeled as a nationalization of the 
sacred. The emphasis here is on how sacred and religious phenomena exist independently 
and are only moved into the national realm through the use of political force or power. 
This categorization originates in the realm of religious practice and moves into the realm of 
nationalism. The sacred also has forces of its own (e.g., its numinous power to terrify and 
fascinate) that exist outside of the political realm. 
Glenn Bowman (1993) has already coined the term, “nationalization of the sacred,” in a 
study of the conflict in Israel and Palestine—a context with some similarities to that of the 
Balkans. Bowman argues (1993) that sacred sites can be called on in the imaginative process 
of a community. Bowman draws heavily on Anderson’s (1998) concept of nationalism as an 
imagined community, but applies it to the process of rebuilding, restoring and occupying 
a sacred space or material. The sacred (e.g., saints or badnjak) exists in itself, but takes on 
a new function in political terms when it is called upon by national agents to serve their 
agenda. From this perspective, religion—characterized by its outlets, including sites, praxis 
and communities—is itself a phenomenon and not a proxy. Religion has been functioning in 
human society long before its adoption by nationalist agents; it is crucial to understand and 
analyze its original function in order to interpret why it is used in nationalism.
To understand the analytical approach based on the concept of nationalization of the sacred, 
it is important to understand how religious praxis, or belief, is adopted, contested or captured 
by a national movement and why it makes sense historically, culturally or religiously for social 
and collective movements to take possession of specific rituals. This line of thinking highlights 
the transnational potential or universal nature of sites, ideas or practices, which can only be 
forcefully adopted by a specific system of nationalism. Bowman’s approach paves the way for 
a much needed focus on the transnational historical contextualization of rituals and beliefs. 
This dialectical approach, suggested here, could be applied to the case of Petar Petrović 
Njegoš’s Mausoleum, a monument in the Lovchen mountains, which has been studied in detail 
(Saggau, 2017b). This became the center of a heated debate on its ownership during Njegoš’s 
bicentennial in 2013. The Serbian Orthodox Metropolitanate contested the Montenegrin 
nationalization of the site, because the Montenegrin state had occupied it and prevented the 
Church from using it as a religious site. In the eyes of the Serbian Metropolitanate, the nationalism 
of the Montenegrin government blocked the sacred nature of the site. The Metropolitanate 
justified its position by asserting the site’s religious sacred value independent of Montenegrin 
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culture, politics or nationalism. This is an example of how the sacred nature of a space could be 
highlighted to prevent the nationalization of the site. In contrast, the Montenegrin government 
was—and still is—deeply invested in the sacralization of the Montenegrin civil-religion of this 
sacred site, which is clearly a sacralization of the nation. In the government’s view, the sacred 
site provides a stage for a civil-religious ritual that can bolster Montenegrin nationhood and 
be used to create a deeper cultural system of references for this form of nationalism. Thus, 
Montenegrin nationalism drinks from the sacred well of the site in order to borrow its power 
to make spectators terrified or fascinated. 
In this case, two opposite interpretations are displayed. On the one hand, the site is being 
used by the government to sacralize the Montenegrin nation, while, on the other hand, the 
site and the ritual of sacralization are contested by Serbian Orthodox Metropolitanate as a 
nationalization of the sacred. In summary, the function of this sacred site is overtaken by the 
Montenegrin political system and that claim is contested by a concerned religious institution, 
the Serbian Orthodox Metropolitanate, which seeks to preserve the site’s function within a 
religious system.
The history of the nationalization of religion
The nationalization of the sacred is not a new process and has already been thoroughly 
studied. The nation-building processes throughout Europe and the Western world in the 18th 
and 19th centuries are filled with relevant examples, as noted by Cavanaugh (2011). During 
this period, several nation-states slowly assumed parts of religion’s former role in these 
societies, also adopting its sacred sites, symbols and heritage. Many sacred elements slowly 
merged together with nationhood, so it has become almost impossible to separate them; in 
Cavanaugh’s concluding words (2011), the holy has migrated from church to state.
Perhaps the most apparent example of this in South Eastern Europe is the Greek Orthodox 
Church, which was founded as part of the contestation of the Byzantine dream of a universal 
Roman and Christian culture. The nationalization of the Orthodox Church in Greece, which 
had been part of the Byzantine mainland, contradicted this universalism. Today, the Church is 
an embedded part of Greek nationhood (Willert 2014). Another example is the emergence of the 
Bulgarian Exarchate in the 19th century and the subsequent condemnation of “phyletisme” by 
the Orthodox Council of Constantinople in 1872. Theologically speaking, and regardless of the 
various historical power struggles between the Bulgarians and the Greeks, this condemnation 
was targeted directly at the nationalization of religion, which, ultimately, was the end goal 
of the institutional process that the independence of the Bulgarian Exarchate had put into 
force (Kalkandjieva 2016, 121). Both examples illustrate institutional processes linked to the 
formation of nationhoods, revived nations and separate independent states.
Besides institutional mechanisms, nationalization of religion or sacred elements can take 
other forms. Nationalization can take place in relation to a sacred site, as described by Bowman 
(1993) and illustrated by the above examination of Njegoš’s Mausoleum (Saggau 2017b). This 
type of nationalization can take several forms, ranging from restoring a church in the image 
of a new nation to rebuilding the site in order to support a new nation to occupation of the 
site. Each of these are physical processes that can secure the sacred site within an imagined 
community. These processes also attest to the fact that the site bears a religious value in itself, 
regardless of the nation—a value that reaches beyond one nation and has to be cut off or 
molded in order for one nation to secure the site within its national belief system.
In the former Yugoslav republics, this process of nationalization has not been as coherent 
and stable as in many other places in Europe. This is largely why to the Yugoslav republics’ 
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late independence from the Ottoman or Habsburgian powers, as well as the shifting formation 
of nations and republics in the region throughout the 20th century (Jelavich 1983a, 1983b; 
Lampe 2000). In contrast, Greece and Bulgaria have had more stability and coherence. Today, 
the Bulgarian Orthodox Church’s organization, churches and clergy are considered to be 
Bulgarian by almost all Eastern Orthodox Churches, unlike during the condemnation of the 
Bulgarian Exarchate in 1872. Meanwhile, the Montenegrin Orthodox Church is officially 
unrecognized and its validity is contested by almost all other traditional Eastern Orthodox 
Churches. 
Conclusion: Ways of nationalization
As argued above, nationalization of the sacred can be seen across South Eastern Europe. 
By addressing the nationalization of the sacred, studies of religion will become more nuanced 
and better able to grasp the depth of religion in the 21st century. This can be done through 
contemporary studies of a) how nationalization is carried out by political and ecclesial elites, 
b) which system of ideas and practices is used, c) which cultural and historical contexts are 
relevant and d) what purpose the nationalization serves. This article has used this approach 
to examine several cases and has referred to several literature studies already applying this 
approach. This article has also illustrated four nationalization processes:
1. the use of institutions 
2. restoration, rebuilding or occupying sacred sites or buildings
3. recovering or claiming saints or sacred materials (crosses, etc.)
4. the use of other societal structures of governance, such as the ecclesiology of kinship 
Milošević’s Gazimestan speech at Kosovo Polje in 1989, as mentioned before, is a clear 
example of several of these processes. The speech was an attempt to use the numinous power 
of the Kosovo Polje site and the saint Lazar for the mobilization of the Serbs in favor of the 
Milošević’s political agenda. It strengthened the Serbian Orthodox Church and its institutions 
throughout Yugoslavia and drew heavily on traditions predating the communist era. These 
processes turned Kosovo Polje into a national monument worth defending; in other words, 
religion was used as a means of national mobilization by social agents.
The “Balkan idol,” as Perica calls the sacralization of nations in Yugoslavia, could only be 
realized because there were sacred symbols, rituals, ideas and organizations that had been 
nationalized in advance. The sacralization of nations requires a sacred source. No one is going 
to kill for the telephone company—the un-sacred nation-state—as Cavanaugh asserts (2011). 
The state and the nation need the sacred to secure their eternal existence. 
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